Global War on Terror and its Impact on National Harmony with Special Reference to Pakistan

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Abstract

The first decade of the 21st century brought devastating internal security problems to Pakistan. It led to growing radicalization, religious extremism and terrorism. The country faced the Taliban threat, suicide bombing and attacks on its security forces. This resulted in Pakistan being perceived as a fundamentalist state sponsoring terrorism and adversely affected its image within the comity of nations. This paper aims at lending a depth of understanding to the growth of militancy and religious extremism in Pakistan by highlighting the causes contributing to its proliferation, role of different institutions to counter terrorism followed by recommendations to curb this menace.

Keywords: terrorism, militarization, democratic consolidation, law and order

1. Origin

Many of the acute problems for which Pakistan has taken centre-stage today in world politics have their genesis in history. Since creation of the country, it has remained associated in various forms. Poor economic conditions, political unrest, unemployment, lack of education, intolerance, lack of social justice, inequality, after-effects of Afghan and Kashmir Jihad and negative contribution of politico-religious parties in interpretation of Islam are the key factors that contributed for promoting militancy and terrorism in the society. The very fiber of the society has been shaken due to human suffering, insecurity among masses, political unrest and economic instability. The same has been further aggravated with suicidal attacks, target killings, kidnapping and brutal killing of foreigners. The roots of militancy and terrorism can be traced back to the following factors:

1.1 External Factors

Afghan War of 1980s and its equally tumultuous aftermath had long-term domestic implications for Pakistan's security. Pakistan decided to become a frontline state in the US war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. This decision helped Pakistan to gain domestic and international legitimacy it was lacking in 1979. The country was relatively isolated internationally. Its relations with America were troubled and the Carter administration had imposed an aid ban on Pakistan in 1978 because of its pursuit of a nuclear capability. Moreover, it was beset by a number of economic problems and the regime was under severe domestic and international criticism because of the execution of former Prime Minister Bhutto in April 1979, following doubtful court proceedings (Wirsing, 1999).

Under these circumstances, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan came as a welcome relief for the government of General Zia-ul-Haq. It helped to strengthen his regime both at the domestic and the international level by altering the geo-political significance of Pakistan for the West. Although Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan War provided it a measure of legitimacy at home and abroad, it also brought multi-facet negative effects on Pakistan's internal security. Support for Afghan mujahedeen brought undesirable side effects for the people of Pakistan and they suffered greatly as a result. The three features most commonly associated with the war are refugees, weapons and drugs.

1.1.1 Refugees

The Soviet occupation of Afghanistan led to a huge evacuation of Afghans across the border to Pakistan, and many settled there permanently. By the time war ended, there were almost 3.45 million refugees residing in Pakistan. Most of these refugees settled in the tribal areas of Pakistan along the Afghan border because of their religious, cultural, ethnic and linguistic ties with the people of that area. Despite government's efforts to keep the refugees inside camps, a large population dispersed throughout Pakistan. This influx of more than three million refugees caused serious social and economic burdens and led to negative consequences for the host society. Everything about them—their numbers, their prowess as fighters, and their impact on economy—had a great impact on Pakistan's internal security (Wirsing, 1991). The Afghan refugees became competitors with the local population for the available employment opportunities. They provided a good and efficient labor force, and this created a high demand for Afghan labor and consequently depressed demand for, and undermined the earning power of unskilled Pakistani workers. Moreover, they influenced some business sectors, which further increased resentment among the local population. Some married locally, purchased shops in the bazaars, dominated the transport industry, started their own business, or simply transferred their trade from Kabul to Pakistan. They led to an increase in rents and spread of diseases. Since the number of hospitals, schools and other public facilities were not increased with the influx of refugees, these were overburdened (Wirsing, 1991).

Law and order of the country was also affected by the arrival of Afghan mujahedeen. Afghan refugees were believed to have contributed to the easy availability of weapons, which in turn was responsible for a national rise in crime and sectarian killings. They were also believed to be responsible for profligate smuggling of consumer goods and drugs into Pakistan (Girardet, 1985). An increase in the country-wide lawlessness during the 1980s could be related to the Afghans residing in Pakistan. As stated by prominent American political analyst Lawrence Ziring, they were well-known smugglers for trafficking in arms and narcotics (1988). Despite the Geneva accord and the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan very few refugees returned to their homeland. Many stayed in Pakistan and permanently settled there. Because of the length of the border, it was not easy to establish check points all along the border. Thus, Pakistan could not effectively restrict cross-border movement. The heavy burden of these refugees that Pakistan shouldered during the war did not lessen even after it ended and this continued to effect on Pakistan's already fragile economy.

1.1.2 Weapons

Prolongation and intensification of the Afghan conflict led to the influx of all kinds of sophisticated weapons into Pakistan. Weapons were provided by the United States to the mujahedeen to help them fight against Soviets, but it is widely believed that not all the weapons intended for the Afghan mujahedeen were used by them. A big portion of all the weapons intended to be used by them were sold in Pakistan. *Financial Times* reported in 1988 that "up to half the arms from the US and elsewhere intended for the Afghan mujahedeen forces were siphoned off in Pakistan or were sold back into the country by the mujahedeen" (1988, April 7).

The weapon business flourished all along the 800-mile Pakistani-Afghan border. It was through this porous Pakistan-Afghan border that during the Afghan war, weapons from across the border were easily moved into Pakistan. These weapons filtered into population centers, passing through the porous border by clandestine routes (Arif, 1995). This flooded Pakistan with weapons and prompted social scientists to coin the term "Kalashnikov culture" (Jefferlot, 2002). Kalashnikov culture was politically militant, some of the mujahedeen belonging to Islamic political parties in Pakistan were also provided with weapons. The availability of weapons sharply increased ethnic and sectarian differences (Brown, 2006). The weapons were easily available to political activists and criminal elements in Pakistan and quantity was not a problem. This led to the militarization of civilian society and increased the level of violence in civilian conflicts within Pakistan. These weapons were freely used during ethnic riots, resulting in the dangerous undermining of law and order throughout the country.

1.1.3 Drugs

The third menace of the Afghan war was the inflow of narcotics into Pakistan from Afghanistan. The mujahedeen brought narcotics from across the border to finance their military operations. In the late 1970s, Pakistan did not have a significant heroin abuse problem, but addiction rose from 5,000 users in 1980, to 70,000 in 1983. According to the Pakistan Narcotics Control Board, heroin use then exploded to more than 1.3 million addicts in less than three years (Haq, 1996). This "heroinization" of society contributed to the degradation of public morality, posed hazards to users' health and raised the level of violence and crime.

1.2 Internal Factors

1.2.1Sectarianism

Sectarianism in the Pakistani context refers specifically to organized and militant religio-political activism whose specific aim is to safeguard and promote the socio-political interests of the particular Muslim sectarian community, Shia or Sunni, with which it is associated. In Pakistan, the most important conflict is not a cultural clash between Muslims and non-Muslims but a clash between different concepts of Islam. It is a major destabilizing factor for the country's internal security. It has a great potential for causing instability because of the high levels of emotion and the consequent religious fervor. Sectarianism was evident in Pakistan's early history but intensified during Zia's regime when many sectarian divisions were first politicized and then militarized. Previously, it was not the Shia-Sunni rift but the anti-Ahmadi movement that was the source of sectarian conflict. It was in General Zia's era that the divide between Sunnis and Shias, on the one hand, and different Sunni groups on the other hand, sharpened

Both internal and external factors were responsible for the politicization and militarization of sectarian groups. Among the internal factors this was Zia's policy toward religion, especially the controversial Islamization process, which   increased sectarian disharmony in the country. Among the major important external factors was the Iranian Islamic Revolution and the subsequent adverse reaction of Saudi Arabia, which further complicated the sectarian issue and resulted in the outbreak of the sectarian proxy war. Because of the politicization of religion by the military regime, Sunni and Shia clerical elites started an aggressive competition with each other, built up their political parties, raised jihadi militias, expanded madrassa networks, and strived to become part of the government. The sectarian violence led to the deaths and injuries of thousands of people in different parts of the country. These groups waged a bloody campaign to safeguard the interests of their respective communities. Shia and Sunni groups attacked each other's mosques and religious schools. By the late 1980s, as a result of sustained violence against each other, a stage came when each of the groups began to declare the other as non-Muslim. The conflict has had a devastating effect on law and order, added to instability and crisis at the societal level, and complicated democratic consolidation. These incidents became a common feature in Pakistan from the mid-1980s onwards. Along with the Shia-Sunni divide, inter-Sunni conflicts also assumed prominence because of Zia's strategy towards the Afghan war. The rift between different Sunni groups, especially between the Deobandi and the Brehlvi, was widened and they started challenging each other for the correctness of their faith. Both the sects already had differences over their interpretations of Islam.

1.2.2 Ethnic, Linguistic and Regional Factors

Pakistan is a multi-lingual and multi-ethnic society where different ethnic groups have always been in conflict with each other for their rights. Ethnicity has been the most serious challenge to Pakistan's integrity since its birth. Un-equal rise in the distribution of wealth and relative prosperity of West Pakistan in the Ayub Era laid the foundation of the feelings of disparity of the East Wing and subsequent rising tensions between the West Pakistanis and their Eastern counterparts. Throughout the decade, the country experienced unrest and protests emanating from the political, industrial and traditional sectors. In the political sector, protests proceeded in the form of meetings and processions, in the industrial sector in the form of strikes, and in the traditional sector in the form of sectarian and ethnic riots. The decade was characterized by communal violence, riots and strikes among students, among workers and among oppressed nationalities with resultant unrest and insecurity. President Ayub could not maintain the national harmony between the provinces of East Pakistan and West Pakistan and it drifted the country towards dismemberment. Thus Pakistan's first experience of terrorism originated in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh), when India actively supported the Mukti Bahini both overtly as well as covertly. In the aftermath of 1971 debacle, Mr. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto took over the charge from President Yahya Khan. He started to treat interior Sindh preferentially in order to firstly neutralize the influence of *Jai-e-Sindh* movement and secondly to consolidate his own position in his home province. As natural fallout, the Muhajir community felt the adverse effects of this partisan attitude of the Sindhi ruler. Problems of ethnicity intensified during Zia's regime. During his decade long rule a bloody ethnic war escalated in Pakistan's southern province of Sindh and the province seemed to fragment into rival ethnic groups. Although the conflict was mainly between Muhajirs and Sindhis, there was a strong presence of other ethnic groups too, especially Punjabis and Pathans. Sindhis had their grievances against the central government from the very beginning but the discontentment intensified progressively. The execution of Sindhi Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto by Punjabi General Zia was a psychological setback to Sindhis and angered them against the central regime.

Sindhi nationalism was based on resentment at the power and wealth of non-Sindhis settled in the province since 1947. The large-scale migration of Pathans and Punjabis into the province during Zia's regime deepened Sindhi alienation against both the central government and the Pathans and Punjabis. The inclusion of Pathans and Punjabis in jobs and industry adversely affected the socio-political and economic interests of Sindhis because the work opportunities which had been available before solely to Sindhis were now shared with these two groups as well. Pathans emerged as "junior partners" to the Punjabis in the military and the bureaucracy. Extensive use of force by the military further alienated Sindhis against the central regime, and this alienation was considered by General Zia to be a threat to his regime's survival. To counter Sindhi opposition Zia decided to create the Muttahida Qaumi Movement (MQM). The creation of the MQM was the grave mistake by him as it further deteriorated the law and order situation, leading to the killing of thousands of people, and had long-term negative implications for the country's internal security. The MQM was the political platform for Muhajirs with its agenda based on protecting the ethnic interests of the Muhajir community. After the emergence of the MQM, the level of violence increased in Sindh, with long-term negative repercussions for the internal security of the province. As stated by I. A. Rahman, "by giving the MQM arms Zia considerably undermined whatever potential this lower middle class party had of contributing to normal democratic politics. Violence or the threat of it became its principal instrument for achieving any objective – from extorting money from a vendor or industrialists to capturing ballots"(Rahman, 2000).

1.2.3 Fall out of Afghan Jihad

As a part of Afghan War strategy, there was a mushroom growth of madrassas during the 1980s. Although madrassas existed in Pakistan before Afghan war, there purpose then was to provide Islamic teachings; along with education, these madrassas provided food and lodging to the poor students on a charitable basis. Nothing in madrassa education was prone to provoke militancy. However, during the 1980s their role changed, as many of these madrassas became nurseries and training schools for Afghan jihad. Rather than producing scholars, these madrassas started producing jihadis. The number of madrassas also increased exponentially. In 1971, there were only 900 madrassas in Pakistan but by the end of General Zia's era, there were 33,000 of them (Rashid, 2000). This proliferation of madrassas and change in their orientation was a direct result of the regime's policies tailored for the Afghan war. Madrassas, by teaching their students that jihad is a spiritual duty, helped to produce a militant mindset in students of the society, i.e., a readiness to wage jihad. This resulted in a major social phenomenon, namely the spread of "jihadi culture" throughout the country. The culture of madrassas and the emergence of radical jihadis brought disastrous consequences for the security of Pakistan, fostering militancy, religious extremism and the emergence of the Taliban.

The spread of the "Taliban" can be regarded as an effect of madrassas and jihadi culture. Jihadi culture persisted, in some respects even worsened, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. The infrastructure built for jihad could not be dismantled by the United States, and, with the Russians gone, the Americans lost interest in Afghanistan. The mujahedeen started fighting among themselves for the control in Kabul and civil war among different factions started. The resistance proved equally unable either to unify the various mujahedeen groups around a central leadership or mount strong and sustained military operations against the well-fortified urban garrisons of the Kabul regime (Wirsing, 1991).

In 1994, a new group, the Taliban emerged on the scene. Its members came from same madrassas established during 1980s. Taliban managed to control two-thirds of Afghanistan and finally captured Kabul in September 1996. While Pakistan's ruling *junta* and religious parties and groups had little ideological commitment with the Taliban, being mainly concerned about the strategic benefits to be gained from supporting them; the longer-term consequences for Pakistan were disastrous, Pakistan became more religiously radicalised, particularly in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, adjoining Afghanistan (Rashid & Murphy, 2009). After 9/11, these Taliban fled across the border into Pakistan's tribal areas and began working from there. Pakistan decided to support America in its war against terrorism; it reversed its pro-Taliban policy and pressured tribal leaders to hand over Taliban members to them. When it failed in these efforts, the Pakistani Army, in cooperation with the United States, conducted a range of military operation in FATA. As a reaction to the Pakistani Army's operation in the tribal areas, supporters of the Afghan Taliban in the tribal areas started to organize a Pakistani Taliban (Bajoria, 2010). Within next two years (2005-2006) they started to make inroads into the settled areas of Pakistan and expanded their control over other parts of Pakistan, such as in South Punjab and other areas of NWFP outside FATA.

Finally, in 2007, thirteen militant groups organized together under the umbrella of Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan. Johns and Fair argued that "the rise of the Tehreek-e-Taliban-e-Pakistan (TTP) network seems to coincide with— or was precipitated by—Pakistani military operations in FATA, as well as U.S. unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) strikes in FATA" (Johns & Fair, 2010).

2. Causes of Terrorism

Various factors that have abundantly contributed towards the rise of militancy and terrorism are following:

2.1 Religious Extremism and the Role of Madrassas

Narrow-mindedness among madrassas' students has been noticed which makes them more vulnerable to exploitation by extremists. Madrassas provide an alternative but limited institutional framework for education to the children of poor and socially deprived people of Pakistan. Children in "Deeni madrassas" are brainwashed thoroughly by the Jihadi / sectarian literature published by different Jihadi/Sectarian organizations. The faculty in "Deeni madrassas" is not exposed to modern knowledge and contemporary technical developments thereby transferring their own limited vision and narrow-mindedness to their pupils. These madrassas, ultimately, create the "mindset" which potentially makes a religious fanatic. Moreover, due to less job opportunities available, maximum graduates of these madrassas find themselves unemployed and become easy targets for different Jihadi/sectarian organizations.

2.2 Taliban

Since its inception, the group has proved to pose a serious internal security challenge for the state. Initially, its activities were confined to the Pashtoon areas of Pakistan, but with the passage of time, it has spread throughout the country. It has challenged the authority of the government in all the four provinces, including the capital, with a lethal bombing campaign. Militant groups have increasingly resorted to suicide attacks (Johns & Fair, 2010) which had resulted in deaths of a large number of people, including military, police and intelligence personnel, and disturbed the security calculus in Pakistan. Number of suicide incidents suddenly increased after 2006

Militant groups are continuously undermining the writ of the government, but the Pakistani Government has failed to eliminate the danger arising from anti-state activities by these hardened militants with a firm hand. Militancy can be described as a "home grown" reality that has taken deep root in Pakistani society for various reasons, including poverty, unemployment, health, illiteracy and social injustice (Khan, 2009). However, the major factor behind the growth of this militancy is the "jihadi culture" and the jihadis created by the government when it was pursuing its Afghan War agenda. While intended to fulfill its strategic commitments and maintain American support, the Pakistani Government failed to foresee the long-term disastrous consequences like domestic radicalization and the rise religious extremism, talibanization and terrorist violence that might result from its actions.

2.3 Poverty

In the society where there is illiteracy, hunger and economic disparity the terrorism flourishes rapidly. All these factors lead to increase in poverty which itself is the mother of terrorism. Famous philosopher Aristotle had agreed on the assertion stating that "Poverty is mother of Terrorism and Revolution" (Classic Quotes, Quotation # 28911). We see for example in Muslim countries there is a huge amount of poverty and that is why, it becomes easier for the terrorist groups to find the interested persons due to their poor economic conditions. Pakistan being one of them; 65.6 per cent of the country's population lives on less than $2 per day (www.worldbank.org.pk). The highest-earning 20 per cent of the population accounts for 42.3 per cent of total consumption while the poorest 20 per cent accounts for just 9.1 per cent (www.worldbank.org.pk).

This drastic anomaly not only results in disparity among its masses but also has become a source of depreciation. Daniel Pipes (2002) says that "As long as there is poverty, inequality, injustice and repressive political systems; militant Islamic tendencies will grow in the world" (www.danielpipes.org). Poverty, unemployment and sense of deprivation are the net outcome, which lead to adoption of violent means.

2.4 Inefficiency of Law-Enforcement Agencies

Poor performance of law enforcement agencies particularly policedepartment is mainly due to lack of will and adequate means to fight against terrorism (Siddiqa, 2009). The present system of policing in Pakistan could not stand up to the intensity of modern wave of terrorism in a professional manner.

Our police appear to be hapless to control not only imported terrorism, sectarian violence and foreign espionage but also often support the religious and political parties (Musa, 1996). The law enforcers, because of their political linkage or lack of a body of competent investigators, as well as due to weak moral fiber of some of their colleagues are unable to handle cases of terrorism. Thus many unapprehended terrorists get set free. In many cases, acquittals take place because of incompetent prosecutors against seasoned criminal lawyers of the accused. The present state of affairs in our society indicates that the rule of law and the criminal justice system have collapsed mainly due to politicizing of law enforcing agencies in general and police in particular.

2.5 Absence of Accountability

No society in the world can be considered inherently self-disciplined. It is mainly the fear of punishment and retribution which governs morality, truthfulness, honesty, and character of human beings across the globe. Our criminals have no such fears. Justice often gets buried along with innocent souls falling victim to ruthless acts of barbarism. The conviction rate of 2.5% has not only emboldened the criminals but also fostered all forms of terrorism in society (Jameel, 2002). The system has failed primarily because of the absence of accountability and transparency, even if the intentions are apparently not mollify.

2.6 Inefficient Judicial System

Present judicial system of Pakistan definitely needs a radical review if we wish that criminals did not go unpunished. Majority of our institutions remain continually at loggerheads with each other to the advantage of the criminals. Our judicial system instead of ensuring speedy justice to the victims, itself lacks in transportation, monitoring, coordinating and accountable mechanism. It is therefore unable to identify and punish those judicial officers who weaken the rule of law. These weak and grey areas coupled with loose amendments in the law encourage the perpetrators of the crime, thus causing erosion of the citizens' confidence in the State.

2.7 Change of Government

Frequent changes of governments preclude a consistent policy to fight the menace of terrorism, to the benefit of perpetrators of violence. It has been observed that with every change of government in Pakistan, rate of crime has gone up in the initial years. Law and order which has been the major concern of all the governments can be taken as a barometer of gauging their performance.

3. Pakistan's Law Enforcement Agencies: Capabilities/Shortfalls-An Assessment

A country's military and second line forces' strength indicate the kind of response it would present to external or internal threats. Keeping the current and emerging terrorism related challenges in view, understanding the role, limitations and capabilities of Pakistan's LEAs (Pakistan Army, Frontier Corps (FC), Frontier Constabulary and Police) as explained briefly in succeeding paragraphs, it is important to find what better course can be adopted by our government in future.

a. Pakistan army is primarily trained to fight a conventional war. In its training doctrine, operations like counter-terrorism, low intensity conflict (LIC) and counter-insurgency did not get due attention in the past, therefore conventional application of force in the initial stages proved costly in terms of casualties. (Khan, 2009)While operations against militants in Waziristan were on, the Pakistan army realized the weaknesses in its operational strategy/tactics and accordingly mobilized its training and intelligence agencies in collaboration with US to impart essential training and to bolster its intelligence capabilities. This has turned the Pak Army a potent force to deal such menace.

b. The FC's current manpower is around 80,000 that will increase to 85,000 following fresh recruitment which is deployed in Baluchistan and NWFP (about 30,000 & 55,000 troops respectively). This force was never designed to fight the kind of war as it is fighting today. Nevertheless, with all the limitations since 2003, it has done a good job (Khan, 2009). New demands and requirements need different kinds of expertise and skills. In addition, low salaries and poor medical facilities have also weakened their morale.

c. The police department has been a target of terrorist attacks for many years now. The department had not been able to evolve an effective strategy against suicidal attacks. Police department is also overstretched, extremely hard pressed and ill equipped to participate in counter terrorism operations.

4. Recommendations

Some general recommendations, based on the lessons of Pakistan's turbulent history, regarding what a civilian government can do about improving the internal security environment and achieving stability would include the following:

4.1 International Dimension

Pakistan must remain a coalition partner and should continue its cooperation in the GWOT. This would not only enable us to eliminate the threat posed to our national security by foreign elements but would also enhance our stature in the eyes of the international community. Moreover, the assistance of international agencies and the financial and material support being received from the coalition partners is in our long term national interest.

With a view to countering propaganda against Islam and the Muslim community which has serious domestic implications, there is an immediate need to shed all differences within the Ummah so that Islam could be projected in its true form, as a peaceful ideology. The conference of leading scholars of the Muslim world organized last year at Mecca was a step in the right direction (Khan, 2009). Similar efforts must continue to develop consensus so as to fight back from a common platform.

4.2 Regional Cooperation

The regional approach can be an effective instrument for the suppression of terrorism within local jurisdiction. Location of China, Iran, Afghanistan, India and Pakistan is considered a most volatile region. The mutual cooperation is the need of the hour for the regional countries to combat terrorism. SAARC is the platform which can be utilized for enhanced cooperation. The commitments made in the declarations of various SAARC Summits with regard to terrorism must also be implemented to improve mutual confidence and trust.

4.3 Domestic Approach

1. The role of the military in relation to the body politic and civil society needs to be readjusted. Since the country's inception, the institutions of civilian governments and politics have largely remained in the shadow of the army, and the army has influenced the country's foreign and domestic policies. Therefore, it is unrealistic to expect an immediate and complete end to military interference in politics and civilian affairs. However, its actions in this regard can be moderated. Change should be gradual, not rapid. For this purpose, the military should be taken in to the confidence of the civilian government and channels of communication between them should be open. Any change introduced without close consultation with the Army would lead to destabilization and risk of obstruction. In order to craft coherent policies for dealing with the range of internal security issues, including militancy, which is one of the paramount threats facing Pakistan today, civilian politicians should stop relying excessively on the Army and its judgment for policy decisions, as they have done in the past (Synnott, 2009). Rather, strategies should be devised through collaboration between the political and military leadership and think tanks.[1] This will mitigate the Army's control over policy decision making.

2. In order to get rid of politicized religion and distorted politics, the education system needs to be reformed. It should be designed to help create a society based on knowledge, participation and empowerment. For this purpose, the first step should be to focus on areas like underfunding and underdeveloped managerial capacity, which has made the standard of education very low. Along with allocating maximum available resources to the education sector, it is imperative to ensure effective and optimum utilization of allocated resources and increase the internal efficiency of the system. With a large percentage of the population in Pakistan illiterate, the literacy rate needs to be improved. This can be done by cost-effective schools, better curricula and creating awareness among the people. There is a strong link between the education sector, madrassas and militancy. Along with reducing the influence of madrassas, good quality education would also create political awareness among the population, encourage moderation, tolerance and accommodation, and all this would ultimately contribute to the control of militancy.

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[1] Mutual collaboration would also help to bring a political solution to deal with militancy as military solutions alone would not help resolve the issue.

3. The economy should be strengthened because a strong economy would do much to ameliorate internal security challenges. For this purpose, the problem of poor public services, inequities in land and income distribution, and social exclusion of the marginalized and vulnerable needs to be tackled. Liberal domestic and foreign investment policies, facilitating more efficient markets, improvements in resource allocation and the enhancement of industrial and agricultural productivity can help to bring about economic development. However, economic development alone cannot resolve security problems unless it is accompanied by the social development that Pakistan badly needs. So the ultimate objective should not just be economic growth but an equitable distribution of the benefits of economic growth. Strategies should be devised for transparent and effective use of foreign aid. Institutions and the people involved in the distribution of foreign funding should be held accountable. Efforts should be directed to resolve the persistent crisis of the centre-province relationship, particularly in regard to their fiscal relations and the dominance of bigger provinces over smaller ones. This would help to eliminate separatist tendencies, reduce popular frustration and limit provincial discontent. This, in turn, would have a positive impact on the country's economy.

4. Measures should be taken to curb the menace of all types of corruption: political, police, civil service and business corruption. Effective preventive and deterrent measures, including strict enforcement of rules and regulations and a system of checks and balances, should be established. Efforts should be made to curb corrupt practices through early detection, investigation and disciplinary action against those found guilty of corruption. For this purpose institutions involved in combating corruption - e.g. the NAB, FIA, police and judiciary - must be transparent. These institutions should be organized on modern and professional lines and should follow open and transparent procedures and processes. All citizens, irrespective of their status, should be held publically accountable to these institutions for their actions.

5. Well-devised and credible policies play a vital role in the smooth functioning of the governing system. However, well devised policies will not work unless accompanied by proper implementation. Implementation of the policies depends greatly on the effective functioning of civilian institutions. Therefore, reforms should be introduced for the restructuring and improved functioning of those institutions. Special commissions should be established to keep a check on the institutions responsible for the monitoring and evaluation of plans. These commissions should issue quarterly or yearly reports on the progress of the implementation of policies. Such reports will highlight various weaknesses in implementation and, ideally, would activate governing institutions to take the measures necessary for improvement.

Reforms in the security sector, including the judiciary and the police, should be introduced to deal with the threat of militancy. Judicial reforms should include a re-examination of the relationships between Pakistan's different court systems. Police reforms should include its restructuring, depoliticization and transformation from a reactive to a proactive organization by adopting different steps such as getting involved with the community and building a relationship of trust between the people and the police. Institutions should not be over-staffed. The work force should be of right size, competent and well paid, so as to limit the temptation for bribery. An efficient criminal justice system would help in the promotion of economic and social development and of human security(Suddle, 2011). The media should be made independent but impartial. In order to improve administrative inadequacies, administrators at the federal, provincial and district levels should be trained with the help of an international body of experts. Along with providing skills, the international community also can be engaged as a source of funding. Civil society, including the media and NGOs, should be involved in providing advice on and help with implementing new programmes. Institutions should be politically neutral, accountable and responsive to the community. Reliable and credible civil institutions are conducive to the creation of a vibrant civil society. If the institutions were strong, Pakistani leaders would be able to get their ideas enacted and this could help to end the prolonged economic and social crisis.

6. Pakistan has always faced an identity crisis, torn between being an Islamic state and a democratic state inspired by the West. Religion has always been used in the ideologically driven identity crisis to serve the political purposes of regimes. Pakistan's internal security problems cannot be resolved without addressing its identity crisis and the role of religion in the state. It must be made clear whether ultimately it is an Islamic state or a Western-style democratic state. Clarifying the proper role for religion in Pakistani governance and addressing the question of identity could help to eliminate ethno-linguistic and sectarian prejudices and establish a durable and unthreatened sense of identity.

7. Pakistan in the past has always had undemocratic elected governments. All the elected governments followed illiberal practices. To emerge from this crisis and establish democratic elected government, civilian governments should have pluralistic and democratic goals. To strengthen the instrument of democracy, fundamental precepts of constitutional rule must be incorporated; in particular the establishment of interactions between different institutions like the media, civil society, the judiciary, parliament and the executive should be encouraged. Over centralization of these institutions by the government should be stopped and they are allowed to play an independent role. Along with creating political awareness among the citizens, political institutions should be reformed so that they can represent the voice of the citizens. Steps should be taken for the establishment of a strong party system. Electoral reforms should be introduced to ensure more participation. Political corruption, e.g. the rigging of elections, should be eliminated. Elections must be fair and free, and the electoral commission should be made more transparent, vigilant and efficient. An increasingly active media and civil society can also help in bringing positive changes to Pakistan's political culture and creating political awareness among people. Reforming political institutions can contribute towards the smooth functioning of the political process, negating the necessity for military takeovers and allowing the state to emerge as a fully democratic entity with the capability to face internal security challenges effectively.

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